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Introduction: Historic Point of Embarkation
The southeast coastal province of China located across the strait from Taiwan,
called Fujian, “has a centuries-old history of being a source of emigrants from China to
1

destinations throughout the world.” Emigrants traveled with the intention of seeking new
opportunity for work and a better life. With 23 provinces, 4 municipalities, and 5
autonomous regions in China, there is often inquiry as to what makes Fujian so special.
There is no question that this prominent coastal location was important to China’s
economy as coastal trading cities. The government established special economic zones to
grant Fujian and the nearby province, Guangdong, special powers in the export and
import industries after the opening up of the regime under Deng Xiaoping. Aside from
the progress of the open-market policy under Deng, there are many noneconomic internal
motives that drove individuals to migrate from Fujian, specifically after 1978. Physical
geography, familial networks, economic-based government reforms, and in some cases
international motives, have influenced high rates of both legal and illegal immigrant
outflow from Fujian. Since the early 1990’s, it is estimated that 95 percent of Chinese
2

illegal aliens originate from the Fujian Province. With the influx of Chinese culture
within the Fujian province, a third space is created that consists of two cultures birthing a
3

new identity.

Judith Banister, Christina Wu Harbaugh, and Ellen Jamison, Population and Migration
Characteristics of Fujian Province, China. Center for International Research, (U.S. Bureau of the
Census, 1993), p. 15.
2
Banister, et al., Population and Migration Characteristics of Fujian Province, China. p. 15.
3
For the purposes of this report, the term “Chinese” refers to individuals of purely Chinese ethnic
origin living in any part of the world.
1
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The Fujian province, with Fuzhou serving as the capital, has a specific topography
consisting of mountainous terrain, accompanied by valleys and rivers. The coastal
landform faces the island province of Taiwan and is composed of peninsulas and bays
facing outward towards the East China Sea. This distinct location made Fujian a natural
port region for the trade of goods and humans, both legal and illegal, due to the feasibility
of traveling to cities beyond the borders of the mainland. The close proximity between
Fujian and the South China Seas allowed for easy access for maritime trade, pioneering
the importance of fishermen and traders. Though the strategic location potentially posed
disheartening to some inland farmers, due to not ideal farming conditions, a majority of
Fujianese individuals adapted and turned to cultivating drought-tolerant sweet potatoes,
peanuts, and other crops often seen in Fujianese dishes today. This shift in the local
economy, paired with the opening of the economy under Deng Xiaoping helped form the
current Fujianese culture of occupying the space of trading, being merchants, and making
a living abroad.

The particular geographical environment of Fujian Province allowed individuals
to generate strong familial blood networks that, in turn, influenced high rates of out
migration. Often times, one can determine someone who originates from this southeast
coastal region solely by their surname. For example, my original family name, Huang
[黄], is a very common name among Fujianese in Taiwan, Hong Kong, mainland China,
and America. From being isolated by mountains and ocean, the Fujianese in the rural
areas have remained in the same region for generations, leading to long-term
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reproduction and descendants honoring the same ancestors. This strong sense of family
and clans have dominated the social scene in Fujian, valuing the presence of blood
connections and blood ties as an internal motive to emigrate. The temple (Figure 1.1) in
my family’s hometown in Fujian has a picture of my grandfather (Figure 1.2). Individuals
relating their native places in Southern Fujian (Minnan), “considering the connections
between the trade and migration involving Fujianese within China” often drifted towards
close relatives, clans, folks, friends, or other forms of blood networks. Although
immigrants are a common phenomenon in the history of Chinese social development,
4

Fujian’s immigration history is particularly distinctive. Due to economic incentives,
geographic location, and strong blood networks, Fujianese individuals were bred to
migrate and establish their own paths throughout the diaspora. American writer and
investigative journalist, Patrick Keefe, touches on this theme of “chain migration” in his
novel, The Snakehead, with regards to Fujianese migration where “the family was
regarded as an economic unit, and the first pioneers to leave the village generally did so
with the aim of establishing a beachhead on a foreign shore and eventually sending for
5

the family.” Through a combination of distinctive geographic location and traditional
devotion to familial ties, Fujian has become a global hub that produces the highest rates
of out-migration in the world.

Lucille Cha, The Butcher, the Baker, and the Carpenter: Sojouners in the Spanish Philippines
and Their Impact on Southern Fujian, Journal of Economic and Social History of the Orient,
2006, p. 510.
5
Patrick R. Keefe, The Snakehead: An Epic Tale of the Chinatown Underworld and the American
Dream, (New York, 2009): p. 29.
4
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Figure 1.1

© Wilson Valdez Photography
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Figure 1.2

© Wilson Valdez Photography
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The largest number of Fujian immigrants are Fuzhou people, particularly from
6

Changle. This trend was not uncommon throughout history, ranging as far back as “the
thirteenth century [when] Marco Polo visited the port of Fuzhou and remarked on the
7

great quantities of its chief exports.” Because Fujian is located in the southeast region of
China, far from the political and economic center, there is a spatial divide among the
neighboring provinces. Being one of “China’s smaller provinces, [Fujian], a mountainous
sliver of coast far from the official influence of Beijing and directly across the strait form
Taiwan, has always been one of China’s most outward-looking regions, home to seafarers
8

and traders, smugglers and explorers: a historic point of embarkation.” Isolation from
mainland China paired with the enhanced exposure to the outside world as well as
Fujian’s specific topography created a physical political divide that allowed the Fujianese
to have such a distinctive experience. Fujian Province has become known as “the
breeding ground for outward migration, secret societies, as well as for people traveling
9

abroad.” The post-Mao economic programs as well as the formation of special economic
10

zones have further emphasized coastal development in China. The Chinese government,
under the reign of Deng Xiaoping, implemented the post-Mao reform and opening policy
in 1978 where many individuals seized the opportunity to thrive abroad. From there,
Fujian was established as a special economic zone and further blossomed to reach its
Patrick R. Keefe, “Snakeheads and Smuggling: The Dynamics of Illegal Chinese Immigration,”
World Policy Journal, V
 ol. 26, No. 1 (2009): p. 33.
7
Ibid, p. 27
8
Ibid, p. 27.
9
Cindy Yik-yi Chu, “Human Trafficking and Smuggling in China,” Journal of Contemporary
China, (2011): p. 44.
10
Jennifer Bolz, “Chinese Organized Crime and Illegal Alien Trafficking: Humans as a
Commodity.” Asian Affairs: An American Review, vol. 22, no. 3, (1995): p 149.
6
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potential as an economic threat. This new open market economy incentivized driven
individuals not averse to migration to seize the opportunity of moving to another
environment for work. As a result of these reforms in the 1980s, the Fujianese working
male population adopted the title of being “temporary residents” wherever they traveled
11

to. These temporary residents, typically workers, students, or family members, further
contributed to the reputation of Fujianese high migration rates. Students from Fujian
would travel elsewhere with the goal of “establishing a beachhead on foreign shore” to be
a resource for their family to later migrate comfortably. This rising trend of expanding
familial blood networks on a global scale, further strengthened the growing reputation
that Fujian acquired of being a “hotbed of trafficking and smuggling in China… moving
West both legally and illegally,” maintaining Fujian’s “commonly acknowledged
emigration history, and this developing coastal province has a concentration of China’s
12

‘human snakes’, namely trafficked and smuggled persons.” The economic reforms and
changes in regulations gearing towards a market economy in China further influenced the
large flow of Fujianese individuals in search of opportunity to work elsewhere. This trend
encouraged individuals to utilize their network of illegal or legal practices, ranging from
13

human trafficking or banking systems. This time period of opening market reform
accompanied by the growing trends of out migration, led to the birth and widespread
growth of the snakehead industry.

Banister, Population and Migration Characteristics of Fujian Province, China, p. 14.
Chu, “Human Trafficking and Smuggling in China,” p. 43.
13
Keefe, “Snakeheads and Smuggling,” p. 41.
11
12

Cotangco
7

Fujian’s commonly acknowledged emigration history can also be attributed to the
social pressure of “going abroad, to earn money and send it back home, and then to
become rich among Fujianese peers. There has been pressure from families and society to
14

earn enough overseas, to return, and then to become bosses at home.” This goes hand in
hand with the rising trend of students going abroad and having to extend their
achievements to their families back home in Fujian. Although the high rates of out
migration lead one to assume that there might be negative incentives involved urging
individuals to want to leave Fujian, but the economy of this special economic zone at the
time was not poor. “According to a 2000 Newsweek article, smuggled Fujianese were
‘seldom poor and desperate’, but they simply followed the tradition of being ‘eager to get
15

rich.’” Typically, those who could afford to go abroad or send their children abroad to
study were the wealthier families that had long resided in Fujian. As a result, rapid
development tended to bypass farmers and peasants, not reaping the direct benefits
caused by the increase in maritime trade in Fujian. As the increasing inflation decreased
their real incomes, a large amount of Chinese turned towards organized crime for a more
16

stable income. These hard working farmers and peasants applied their work ethic to
their occupations abroad. Throughout the Fujianese diaspora, migrants and workers
earned the reputation of being hard working and economically driven.

Chu, “Human Trafficking and Smuggling in China,” p. 44.
Ibid,” p. 43.
16
Bolz, “Chinese Organized Crime and Illegal Alien Trafficking,” p. 153.
14
15
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The rising presence of Fujianese throughout the Chinese diaspora created a
specific niche of driven individuals seeking opportunity elsewhere. Because of the
change in laws and regulations during the mid-1980s under Deng Xiaoping, the rush of
individuals yearning to go abroad ran high, specifically among students and workers.
This new commodification of Fujianese overseas travelers to fill the void of students and
workers allowed for the birth of a new identity throughout the diaspora. This specific
niche created a new “third space,” a term coined by Homi Bhabha that describes the
emerging gray area that these Fujianese travelers adopted, forming their hybridized
identities overseas. This “third space” intersects and overlaps multiple spheres of cultural
identity, combatting maintaining the authenticity of representing their home nation, while
navigating a new culture. Edgar Wickberg argues “that immigration and settlement
stimulate a need to redefine oneself and one’s family in ways that will adapt to the new
17

environment yet be consistent with one’s values, if possible.” Reiterating the strong
familial kinship tradition, those family members left behind in Fujian later set off to
reunite with their blood networks who had fled to study or find work. Identifying as a
student or as a worker were the requirements that led to exclusion of those who did not
fall under the category, “there was a clear demand to leave by people who did not fit into
either of those two categories. It was under these circumstances that ‘snake people’ or
‘snakehead’ (she tou) smugglers began to emerge and the tidal wave of emigration began

Edgar Wickberg, “Global Chinese Migrants and Performing Chineseness,” Journal of Chinese
Overseas, vol. 3, no. 2, (2007): p. 178.
17
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18

to swell.” This new formation of the “snakehead” as an untraditional occupation arose
from the emerging demand for Fujianese migrants around the world, whether that be
legally or illegally. Tracing Deng Xiaoping’s legislation changes that sparkplugged a
major wave of both legal and illegal emigration from China in the 1980’s allowed for the
reputation of having the largest immigrant rates to be formed. This combination of
economically driven individuals and crafty snakeheads resulted in “more than half of
Asia’s forty billionaires of Chinese ancestry in the year 2000 ha[ving] roots in Fujian
19

Province. What the Fujianese did best, it sometimes seems, was leave.” As a result this
trend of out migration and assimilation into new cultures allowed for Fujianese migrants
to progressively form new identities in foreign spheres. This thesis will be covering
several topics regarding Fujianese immigration and approaches to the “third space,”
ranging from the historical incentives during the 1980’s and birth of “snakeheads,” to the
Fujianese migrants in the Philippines, and finally, the complex nature of transcultural
hybridity that has resulted from globalization.

20

In 1594, one of the world’s first Chinatown establishments arose in the
Philippine capital, Manila, and marked the beginning of a new tradition of familial
networks and native place associations which sprouted from working men who branched
out to find work in foreign lands. Since this establishment of the Chinatown in the central

Zai Liang, “Demography of Illicit Emigration from China: A Sending Country's Perspective.”
Sociological Forum, vol. 16, no. 4, (2001): p. 681.
19
Keefe, “The Snakehead,” p. 29.
20
Edgar Wickberg, "The Chinese Mestizo in Philippine History." Journal of Southeast Asian
History 5, no. 1 (1964), p. 70.
18
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city of Binondo, located within metro-Manila, the Chinese have remained a longstanding
minority in the Philippines and “coexisted with Filipinos throughout the colonial era of
21

Spain, United States, and Japan.” This historical relationship between the Chinese and
Filipinos has played an integral role in the formation of the Chinese-Filipino identity.
Another facet that has contributed to the uniqueness of the Chinese-Filipino identity is
the vast population of Fujianese in the Philippines. A large majority of Chinese
22

immigrants that reside in the Philippines can trace their roots back to Fujian. Tracing
back to “the 1570s, Fujianese merchants had established trading posts in Manila and
Nagasaki. Seed communities of Fujianese traders were established throughout Southeast
Asia, and today, centuries later, vast numbers of ethnic Fujianese are scattered throughout
23

the region.” This distinct formation of transcultural identity has encouraged various
forms of representation throughout the Fujianese diaspora. Many Chinese individuals
have maintained their ethnic identity through means of their own, whether that be through
maintaining traditions, retaining language, or returning back to their ancestral homes in
China. For example, the first female president, “President Corazon Cojuangco Aquino,
whose great grandfather was an immigrant from the southeastern part of Fujian, China,
24

visited her ancestral home in 1988.” Her paternal great-grandfather, Co Yu Hwan,
converted to Catholicism after emigrating from Fujian and adopted the name Jose

Uytanlet, Juliet Lee. The Hybrid Tsinoys: Challenges of Hybridity and Homogeneity as
Sociocultural Constructs among the Chinese in the Philippines. (Pickwick Publications, 2016): p.
4.
22
Richard Chu, The “Chinese” and the “Mestizos” of the Philippines: Towards a New
Interpretation, Philippine Studies Vol 50, No. 3, (2002): 327.
23
Keefe, “The Snakehead,” p. 27-28.
24
Chu, The “Chinese” and the “Mestizos” of the Philippines, p. 327.
21
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25

Cojuangco. As a prominent political figure, President Aquino embraced her Fujianese
heritage and instilled nationalistic attitudes inspiring pride in identifying as
Chinese-Filipino in the Philippines. Similar to my own family’s background, President
Aquino and many other mixed Chinese-Filipino individuals have approached the task of
forming a unique in-between identity that neither confines nor defines them.

Similar to President Aquino’s background, my family came across the Filipino
surname, Cotangco, in an unconventional way, leaving behind the Chinese surname,
Huang. Many Chinese-Filipino individuals share a similar experience, not only having to
assimilate culturally, but also physically adapting their surnames to better fit in.
Occurring after China’s transition to a market economy in the 1980s, which resulted from
a widespread embrace of globalization and increasing waves of immigration from Fujian,
the Chinese-Filipino identity has vastly undergone changes. This particular topic of
research regarding identity and cultural formation is of relevance to me because along
with understanding my own culture’s unique historic background, I’m also able to trace
my own “third space” as a form of hybridity. Through researching my own familial
history, I have been able to discover the hybridity that forms the nuances of my personal
cultural identity (straddling the line between Chinese-Filipino and American culture and
identity). Because my paternal grandfather emigrated from Fujian to the Philippines,
living part-time with his Fujianese wife and children and splitting time with his Filipino

David Wurfel, “Elites of Wealth and Elites of Power. The Changing Dynamic: A Philippine
Case Study,” Southeast Asian Affairs, (1979): 235.
25
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wife and children. He made sure to indulge my father and his six other siblings in the
Philippines with Chinese culture, enrolling each child in a Chinese Christian schools.
This religious assimilation allowed the transition for my grandfather and many other
Chinese Filipino immigrants from Fujian to assimilate smoothly into a new culture. To
illustrate the many changes in identity formation, and the navigation of new cultural
spaces, I will incorporate interviews I’ve conducted with family members who share their
Chinese-Filipino experiences throughout the diaspora. In these conversations, we discuss
their relationship with cultural hybridity, identifying as Chinese-Filipino, and the “third
space.”

Cotangco
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Chapter 1: Snakeheads as Facilitators
When discussing Fujian migration, in both legal and illegal terms, it is important
to acknowledge the intricate network of collaboration involved. Stemming from an
integral and ancient social practice in China, guanxi, or personal connection, extends to
26

all levels of society, particularly in the business sector.

This phenomenon, specific to

Chinese traditional culture is “an indigenous Chinese construct and [is] define[d] as an
informal particularistic personal connection between two individuals bound by an
implicit psychological contract to follow the social norm of guanxi such as maintaining a
27

long-term relationship, mutual commitment, loyalty, and obligation.” In other words,
the practice of cultivating a guanxi network is a dynamic process of mutual reciprocity
that has played an essential role in achieving social mobility in Chinese society. Forming
one’s own guanxi network places value on the system of essential connections required to
28

succeed in the “ancient Chinese social system and its political and moral philosophy.”
In practice, government officials utilize their guanxi network, relying on being
29

well-connected to higher ranked officials in order to gain promotion. Although the
deeply embedded concept of guanxi has been ingrained into Chinese society since the
Chinese social philosophy of Confucianism, it is important to distinguish these informal

Xiao-Ping Chen and Chao C. Chen, “On the Intricacies of the Chinese Guanxi: A Process
Model of Guanxi Development,” Asia Pacific Journal of Management, (2004), Vol 21, Issue 3, p.
305.
27
Ibid., p. 306
28
Ibid., p. 307.
29
Sebastian Heilmann, “Governing China’s Economy,” China’s Political System, (Rowman &
Littlefield: 2017), p 233.
26
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30

relationships from corruption. Maintaining one’s guanxi directly corresponds with the
widespread increase of government corruption in China. Albeit a sensitive topic, this
top-down corruption and incorporation of these complex networks correspond with the
31

collaborative efforts involving snakeheads.

Originating in the 1970’s, snakeheads went into business charging fees to
customers via ferry to travel from Changle or Fuzhou, two major cities in the Fujian
32

Province.” Snakeheads are defined as the Chinese individuals, predominantly
originating from Fujian, that assist in the process of smuggling individuals to other
countries. Clients of snakeheads aimed to migrate from Fujian and extend the diaspora
globally, further opening up the market for the snakehead business to prosper. According
to Patrick Radden Keefe, international labour migrants, also known as Overseas Chinese,
represent the second largest diaspora on the planet, after the descendants of African
33

slaves. These labour migrants or Overseas Chinese were perceived through a mixed
lens. Labour migrants were either seen as positive business assets, typically because they
were crafty and driven individuals willing to work, or viewed negatively, impacting and
contributing to the decline of local host economies. As the global demand for
international labour migrants increased, the snakehead business continued to grow

Xiangru Yin, “An Analysis of Corruption in China: The Guanxi Network of Chinese High
Level Officials and Governors,” (2017), International Development, Community, and
Environment (IDCE). 6.
31
Patrick Radden Keefe, “Snakeheads and Smuggling: The Dynamics of Illegal Chinese
Immigration,” World Policy Journal, (2009), p. 41.
32
Ibid., p. 35.
33
Ibid., p. 34.
30
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accordingly. These snakeheads were linked to an complicated process of professional
smuggling involving Overseas Chinese on various levels. Some scholars view these
individuals as illegal criminals, while others see them as “resourceful individuals,
34

enterprising tour-guides, or nomadic figures.” Sheldon Zhang and Ko-lin Chin (2003)
conducted a cross-national study providing a factual stance on the complexities regarding
the nature of the snakehead individuals. Uncovering the complicated process required to
carry out the smuggling of individuals, Zhang and Chin take an optimistic approach
towards the snakehead business, viewing these snakeheads as pawns in a larger business
scheme that plays a part in an overall corrupt system. Through conducting face-to-face
interviews, Zhang and Chin paint snakeheads in a civilized manner, alluding to the profit
bearing aspect and profitability that the unique occupation provides around the world.

35

On the other hand, Cindy Yik-yi Chu clarifies the distinction between human smuggling
and human trafficking, because she believes that both modes of migration are “serious
36

problems which have proven difficult to resolve.” She raises the important question of
whether snakeheads and organized crime groups are advantageous or disadvantageous to
the local economies. Chu contrasts Zhang and Chin’s perspective that snakeheads are
particularly crafty and driven individuals, by referring to them as a global problem,
detrimental to the local economies. However, Chu also introduces criticism towards the

Ibid., p. 34.
Sheldon Zhang and Ko-lin Chin, “Characteristics of Chinese Human Smugglers: A
Cross-National Study.” San Diego State: 2003, p. 1.
36
Cindy Yik-yi Chu, “Human Trafficking and Smuggling in China,” Journal of Contemporary
China, 2011, p. 39.
34
35
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corrupt governing system that involves and allows this illegal smuggling to occur and
believes that the transnational criminal offenses and manipulation of human rights should
be addressed on a global scale. The research conducted by these authors provide relevant
insight to the polar position that snakeheads occupy in the rapid process of globalization.

Jennifer Bolz, a transnational trafficking expert, takes into consideration the
stance that the government legislation has on these complex smuggling organizations,
further questioning the validity and accountability of the corrupt systems within Chinese
government. The systematic corruption is further analyzed by questioning who is to
blame for the sudden rise in illegal Chinese immigration that has sparkplugged and
become a phenomenon affecting the global economy. In comparison, Glenn Curtis and
his colleagues (Glenn E. Curtis, LaVerle B. Berry, Seth L. Elan, Rexford A. Hudson,
Nina A. Kollars, 2003) further dissect the transnational activities of ethnic Chinese
criminal groups and organizations, specifically investigating individuals in snakehead
groups who have assisted these illegal Chinese migrants. The purpose in bringing these
authors, scholars, and researchers into my discussion is to compare the conflicting
perspectives that address the complex field of human smuggling. Through analysis of
various discussions regarding snakeheads and migration, albeit legal or illegal, this
section hints at the emerging effects of transcultural integration and intermingling
throughout the Fujianese diaspora.

Human Smuggling: Business is Business

Cotangco
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Sheldon Zhang and Ko-lin Chin (2003) provide an extensive study uncovering the
inner workings of Chinese human smuggling organizations and their operations. By
interviewing individuals in both the U.S. and China, their researcher concluded that
human smugglers, commonly known as snakeheads, “have been able to develop
extensive global networks and transport Chinese nationals to various parts of the world.”
37

Zhang and Chin recognize the complex process that requires multiple phases of

involvement at the potential risk of imprisonment. Their study outlines the methodology
“snakeheads” use through three main areas: the utilization of U.S. bordering countries
such as Mexico or Canada, flying to the U.S. and gaining access through the transit
38

points, and traveling via boat using fishing trawlers or freighters. These difficult
journeys involve multiple stages and various members to comply and participate in the
human smuggling operations. Zhang and Chin conclude that there are several highly
specialized roles involved in the smuggling process. This process includes: recruiters,
coordinators, transporters, document vendors, corrupt public officials, guides and crew
39

members, enforcers, and debt collectors. Zhang and Chin dedicate a significant portion
of their study to analyzing the outcome of attitudes that the general public has regarding
snakeheads. Typically, the result tended to be positive due to the fact that snakeheads
“saw themselves as upstanding businesspeople or even do-gooders who helped their
40

friends and neighbors in their search for a better life.” This approach to the social work

Sheldon Zhang and Ko-lin Chin, “Characteristics of Chinese Human Smugglers,” San Diego
State: 2003, p. 1.
38
Ibid., p. 2.
39
Ibid., p 16.
40
Ibid., p. 18.
37
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that snakeheads fulfill has a more optimistic approach towards this form of organized
crime and human smuggling. Although the outcome does not result in direct harm
towards other individuals or the economy, some snakeheads perceived their work of
transporting human cargo elsewhere as a solution to solving China’s various social
41

problems (i.e. overpopulation and unemployment). Although these individuals put their
livelihood at risk, “neither the migrant party nor the smugglers directly considered
transnational human smuggling to be a crime and that they would rather view it as a
42

‘good deed.’” Of those involved in the smuggling process, corrupt public officials and
other law enforcement authorities must not be discounted. This approach to the broader
implications that come along with the snakehead business of human smuggling, raises the
question of morality with regards to whether the government funded roles involved in the
smuggling process were aware of the systematic corruption they were contributing to.
Corrupt government involvement insinuates and encourages the acceptance of human
trade among the “law-abiding people, including reputed businesspeople and community
43

leaders,” that occupy a majority of Chinese society. Snakeheads and other individuals
involved in the smuggling process undoubtedly influence various levels of Chinese
society. Similar to the complex practice of cultivating one’s own guanxi n etwork, the role
of snakeheads in contributing to Chinese society allows for potential discussion in the
controversial topic of systematic corruption.

Ibid., p. 19.
Ibid., p. 19.
43
Ibid., p. 19.
41
42
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Who’s to Blame: Globalization or Government?
Continuing the analysis provided by Zhang and Chin (2003) that Chinese
snakehead business exposes government corruption and bribery that coincides with the
process of human smuggling, history professor at Hong Kong Baptist University, Cindy
Yik-yi Chu (2011) examines the cause(s), nature, and impact of the global problems
regarding the practice of human trafficking and smuggling in China. In her analysis of
transnational crime, Chu clarifies the distinction between human smuggling and human
trafficking. Although the positive perspective is voluntary, both smuggling and
trafficking contribute to the illegal migration patterns from Fujian. The definitive barrier
between the positive and negative perspectives towards snakeheads allows for further
analysis. This gray area concerns various factors of influence involved, whether that be
government mediation or societal indifference towards the matter of human transfer. In
relation to the snakehead network, Chu further details the large amount of risk that
individuals take on when involved with human smuggling from China and the effect that
this newly commodified field of work involving snakeheads has on the economy. She
identifies the global nature that comes hand in hand with the snakehead organizations.
Representing the various avenues of connectivity that comes along with transnational
migration and human trading, Chu mentions that “with globalization, the snakehead
networks have become increasingly complicated and the smuggling routes have been
44

hard to trace, together facilitating this human trade.” The complex role of the snakehead
bridges the gap between cultures, further strengthening the relationships between the host

44

Chu, “Human Trafficking and Smuggling in China,” p. 43.
Cotangco
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countries and these Fujianese migrants in search for opportunity elsewhere. Though often
times controversial, the role that the snakehead individuals take on as facilitators for
cultural preservation is important to acknowledge in the migration process.

Chu frames the work of snakeheads as a problem addressed by the Chinese
45

government in 2002. Chu mentions that “smuggled people have contributed to labor in
the black market, and this has led to the reduction of the general income of residents of
destination countries. At the same time, trafficking has involved kidnapping and
exploitation… Making matters worse, trafficking has led to a rise in crime in destination
46

places.” This shift in perspectives raises an interesting point of view towards smuggled
individuals as parasitic to the host country, negatively affecting the global economy
through black market labor. Chu concludes her article by directing the responsibility to
the local and global governing systems in power. Emphasizing the transnational
connections required of the snakehead individuals, Chu points towards “international
cooperation [to] effectively facilitate the arrest and prosecution of the snakeheads, and
47

the tracing of the trafficking and smuggling gangs.” She casts the blame upon “the
central government [who] will need to increase the penalty for such offenses and to
educate the public on the terrible consequences of these ever-growing trafficking and
smuggling crimes, the results of which have been forced labor, sex trade, illegal adoption
of children, deaths during trips, a lack of concern for human rights, an expanding
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smuggling network, and so on.” Chu’s positionality of the negative repercussions
towards the global economy as well as the governing systems shows the high risk that
this lifestyle of human smuggling brings about.

Holding the government legislation accountable for the health and safety of their
host regions, Chu raises an interesting question that Jennifer Bolz also seeks to expand
on. Bolz dissects the tragedy that occurred in the early 90s, where a Panamanian vessel,
the Golden Venture, hosting 300 individuals of human freight had crashed, and as a
49

result, 175 of these illegal immigrants were sent to jail. Tangentially, Bolz questions the
accountability of the larger, global, issue of human smuggling by asking: “Why do
thousands of Chinese risk death, deportation, and potential indentured servitude in order
to reach a foreign country whose citizens are becoming more and more unsympathetic to
50

the plight of illegal aliens?” She expands on the growing network of the triad societies
and how these societies have developed as dominant in controlling international
smuggling. She adopts the stance that these “Chinese crime groups have become an
international threat,” further exposing the government links to organized crime societies.
51

Bolz emphasizes the global collaboration necessary to combat the “international threat”

of smuggling. She concludes that the solution to combating the trend of illegal alien

Ibid., pp. 48-49.
Jennifer Bolz, “Chinese Organized Crime and Illegal Alien Trafficking: Humans as a
Commodity,” Asian Affairs, 22, no. 3 (Fall 1995), p 154.
50
Ibid., p. 150.
51
Ibid., p. 150.
48
49

Cotangco
22

trafficking is to hold the government systems accountable and encourage growth in the
economic development of China.

Curtis and his colleagues (Curtis et. al, 2003) introduce triads, as a “form of secret
society that first appeared in the seventeenth century in southern China in opposition to
52

emperors of the Qing Dynasty.” These early forms of organized crime syndicates paved
the way for snakeheads to arise. Curtis clarifies that not all organized Chinese crime
groups are attributed to the triad model, though the triad-like rituals and structures are
53

similar in the process of smuggling individuals from China. Although Curtis adopts the
stance that these criminal groups constitute a threat to the societies in which they assume,
the large support system involved in harboring illegal migrants is “efficient in creating
loose, flexible multinational structures that are often linked with legitimate business and
enterprises; exploiting weaknesses in the law enforcement systems of individual
54

countries.” Similar to Zhang and Chin’s approach regarding the advantages that the
snakeheads provide towards solving China’s social problems, Curtis argues that although
these triad-like crime organizations sprouted from a field of illegal potential threats to
society, they often include the involvement, and promotion of, legal businesses. Curtis
acknowledges that Ko-lin Chin (Zhang, 2002) clarifies that “the term ‘organized crime’
may not apply strictly to what is nevertheless a very large and growing form of criminal
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activity. It is certain that individuals at the transit points are Taiwanese, Chinese, and
non-Chinese, although the initiators of this global business are specifically Fujian
55

Chinese in the United States.” Curtis uses this fact to strengthen his more neutral
approach that organized crime is vaguely defined and varies in different circumstances,
focusing more in depth on the differing levels of snakehead operations. He makes the
distinction between snakeheads, which largely focuses on illegal human smuggling, and
triads and gangs, which “are also involved in recruiting and smuggling of women for the
56

sex trade in the United States and in running brothels in Chinese communities.” He
clarifies that Chinese triads are largely active in the raw materials trade business, often
transporting more than just humans, while snakeheads focus their efforts on individuals
interested in migration. The negative connotation associated with “illegal” or
“smuggling” creates a distinction that defines the varying positionality with regards to
these “organized crime groups.” Although there is some overlap between the historical
origin of triads and snakehead organizations, the distinction must be made regarding the
perspective of this illegal occupation that is in such high demand, particularly in Fujian.

With this in mind, migrants who choose to employ this method of transcultural
smuggling submit to valuing and retaining the authenticity of their Chinese culture, rather
than directly adhering to assimilation and conformity. Although there are mixed
perspectives regarding the snakehead industry and their role in hybrid cultural formation,
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the multiple components revert the blame to a systematically corrupt governing structure.
Through an understanding of varying snakehead perspectives regarding organized crime
networks, we come to better understand the nature of globalization and intercultural
influences on a transnational sphere. The rise in demand of Chinese workers as a global
commodity puts governing systems in a difficult supporting position. Governments are
stuck between the blurred lines of legal and illegal migration, and the birth of the
snakehead as an occupation has formed the potential propagation of new identities
throughout the Fujianese diaspora. Snakeheads strategically utilize their ambiguous
position in society to further contribute to hybrid formation of Chinese identities
throughout the diaspora in a global setting.

Cotangco
25

Chapter 2: Chinese-Filipino Hybrid Identity
As I walked through the bustling streets of Ongpin in the heart of Binondo, my
aunt pointed out the familiar restaurants and markets she frequented during her
childhood. Walking north of the Pasig River, we passed the fountain which stands
profoundly at the entrance of the Plaza San Lorenzo Ruiz which was later renamed for
Governor-General Gomez Pérez Dasmariñas, the Dominican friar who contributed to the
57

creation of Binondo Church in the 16th century. Visiting the site, I remember being in
58

awe of the religious monument, one of the first and main churches in Manila. Stepping
back to properly examine the faded and dusty concrete bricks of the building, I noted the
surroundings: an interesting mix of pushy tourists, the darkened feet of homeless
Filipinos poking out from under umbrellas, Chinese shops decorated to excess with red
lanterns, and crowds of schoolchildren rushing and playing across the streets. This area,
specifically, was a culmination of years of maritime trade history, Spanish colonization,
and cultural intermingling due to Western hegemony and globalization representative of
the not-so homogenous attitudes among the Chinese in the Philippines. This
thought-provoking space, now occupied by a multitude of individuals with varying
backgrounds, allowed for the formation of a “third space” as a result of the hybridized
cultures coming together. New forms of distinctions have arisen through this clash of
civilizations. The term Sangley, or Chinese mestizo, for example, is separate from the
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Spanish mestizo, but implies the same social changes that occurred in the Philippines.

The socio-cultural nuances adopted by Filipino-Chinese formed an identity that was not
only fluid, but also very ambiguous. In this way, this flexible identity allows for a
multitude of interpretations that challenge the duality of what it means to be
“Chinese-Filipino,” rather embracing the multilayered aspects of the characteristics and
categories of what it means to identify as a “Catholic,” “mestizo,” “Tagalog Filipino,”
“Inchik,” “Tsinoy,” or “Chinese” in the Philippines. In addressing the varying categories
contributing to what it means to identify as Chinese-Filipino, I was able to contextualize
my unique experience as a cultural hybrid.

In collaboration with extensive interviews with family members, this chapter will
analyze the impact that Fujianese trade and migration to the Spanish Philippines had on
the current60 identity of current Chinese-Filipinos throughout the diaspora. Due recent
time spent in the Philippines, I was able to gain a better understanding of my family’s
experience and upbringing as Chinese-Filipino individuals, and their navigation of life as
Chinese-Filipinos in the Philippines. Although I was never able to meet my grandfather,
the founder of the “Cotangco” family presence in Manila, I came to gain an appreciation
for his business ventures and decision making resulting from the extensive legacy he left
behind for his seven children in the Philippines as well as two sons in Fujian. Hearing
only respectful and positive attributes associated with my grandfather, I felt as though I
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had an accurate glimpse into his life, albeit his passing away before I was born. He was
able to build a foundation for the entire Cotangco extended family, as a way of living
comfortably, by craftily obtaining a rice mill, shoe business, and multiple buildings
throughout metro Manila. In sum, my grandfather was able to successfully cultivate his
61

guanxi, “translated into English as ‘connections’ or ‘relationships.’” By navigating the
new cultures and spheres in the Philippines, he was able to spread motivations of growth
and independence from his upbringing in Fujian. My grandfather’s experience
maneuvering a new locale while maintaining his Fujianese roots, and then transferring
these notions of preserving the core of his familial values and beliefs, identifies one of the
routes towards the “third space” that the Chinese-Filipino encompasses.

My father, Edilberto, is the second youngest of seven siblings, and was the first to
immigrate to America in search of better opportunity. All of the seven Cotangco siblings
had varying experiences growing up, considering that they each attended different
schools and had different friend groups that they associated with. A prime example of the
various routes that the “third space” comprises of, varying from my father’s experience to
that of his siblings. The oldest of the seven siblings, Juanito or John Cotangco, attended
Crusaders-Lorenzo Ruiz Academy, a Filipino-Chinese Catholic school on Ongpin Street
in Binondo. Still fluent in Hokkien, the Fujianese language that was taught at
Crusaders-Lorenzo Ruiz Academy, he went on to open up his own fried chicken

Pierre Ostrowski and Gwen Penner. “Chapter 5 ‘Guanxi’ and ‘Mianzi.’” It’s All Chinese to
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franchise called Johnny’s Fried Chicken, which has locations all throughout Metro
Manila. He was one of two siblings that attended this Filipino-Chinese Catholic School,
including my aunt, Amelia Cotangco, who was the eldest female sibling whom I will
refer to as Tita Mely. She went on to get her undergraduate degree at the University of
the Philippines and fulfilled her career aspirations to be the Justice in the Court of Tax
Appeals in Manila. Luckily, I was also fortunate enough to interview my two cousins,
Wilson and Eyley, who have retained the surname Wong or Huang from the Fujianese
province that our grandfather came from. Their father, Wong Ying Hian, was the second
son that my grandfather gave birth to with his Chinese wife in Fujian (my dad’s
half-brother) and relocated to the Philippines, after the first son, Wong Ying Kiaw, who
relocated to Malaysia. This pair of siblings were two of my five cousins from who
originated from my grandfather’s Chinese family who retained our traditional family
name Huang in Fujian or Wong in Hong Kong. Eyley is the eldest of the Wong siblings,
and moved to the Philippines at a young age. She attended the same Filipino-Chinese
school that my father and the younger of the siblings attended, Grace Christian. Wilson
currently resides in Australia, but relocated from Fujian to Manila to live with my father
and his siblings. These complex relationships have often been overlooked because of the
strong sense of familial value that the Filipino community has. Figure 2.1 (below)
provides a clear visual of my family tree in order to provide a better understanding of the
example relationships and experiences provided.
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Figure 2.1
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Growing up, I was told that my dad’s neighbors and family friends were to be
called Tito or Tita, the Tagalog word for uncle or aunt, because neighbors and family
friends were to be treated with the same respect and value as a family member, regardless
of their blood relation. Whether this was a Filipino trait or not, my grandfather adopted
this method of creating close connections very quickly upon arriving in the Philippines.
He sent my eldest aunt and uncle, Tita Mely and Papa Johnny to live at a host family’s
home during their time attending Crusaders-Lorenzo Ruiz Academy in the city of Manila.
The family they stayed at was a Fujianese family that was informally indebted to my
grandfather, allowing my aunt and uncle to live there during six days of the week to
prevent the long commute from our familial home in the province of Marikina to Manila.
This exemplifies the extension of my grandfather’s guanxi network and likeability,
permeating from his individual experiences to his reputation of being a prominent
businessman constantly looking to help others. In my interview with my Tita Mely, she
conveyed her resentful sentiments growing up, “laging tumatakbo ako, sa Linggo ako ay
62

magmadali upang mahuli ang bus sa Marikina.” Reiterated in translation, she
emphasized how Sundays were important days for family gathering after Church. Her
words also spoke of a time when she had to run to catch the bus from school in the city to
the family home in Marikina for the afternoon, then hurry back for a quick turnaround in
preparation for school the next morning. Although in the moment, she was resentful
towards her parents for sending her to a school in the city, disallowing her from living at
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home where her siblings and friends lived, she harbored no hard feelings for being
engulfed in Chinese culture. This unique experience of living with a host family forced
my aunt and uncle to solely speak Hokkien in the household and at school, as well as
form a unique bond with this Chinese family who my grandfather was very close with.
Incorporating the multiple perspectives and experiences of my family members in the
Philippines, I was able to broaden my scope aside from the historical texts and factual
background of my research. In doing so, I gained a better understanding of the
uniqueness of the Cotangco family’s experience, but also found that this dual
Chinese-Filipino life was not uncommon. This prevalent notion of hybrid identity as a
result of the centuries of globalization and transcultural exposure in the Philippines
resonates not only with my own experience creating a “third space” identifying as a
first-generation Filipino-American, but with many other ethnically Chinese individuals
throughout the diaspora.

Although “Chinese mestizos (to use the Philippine term for persons of mixed
Chinese-native ancestry) have not been formally and legally recognized as a separate
group — one whose membership is strictly defined by genealogical considerations rather
than by place of birth,” these individuals play an essential role in not only Filipino
63

society, but also in the economy. A similar trend with regards to identity and sentiments
of “separateness” have been documented in Richard Chu’s Chinese & Chinese Mestizos
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of Manila book which was published in 2010, where he introduces the Chinese mestizo
64

experience that was determined upon the father or husband’s ethnic classification. This
systematic classification of Chinese mestizo or Sangley identity harbored these
anti-Chinese sentiments or anti-Sinicism originated in the Western world. These
distinctions have formed the “nation-based approach to the study of ethnic identities, an
approach that is often couched in exclusionary-inclusionary, binarist, or either-or terms”
65

that will be addressed in this chapter.

The distinct racial and ethnic divide between Chinese immigrants and the
Filipinos today have been derived from various different factors that I aim to simplify in
this chapter. Segregation of these Chinese immigrants from Fujian was initially due to
religious incentives and colonization, economic opportunity, and familial ties that further
led to a noticeable “otherness” among the local Chinese-Filipino communities. Whether
this be assessed through the conformity to the Spanish Christian religious beliefs, or the
ambivalence towards assimilating to this religious culture, this formulation of social
norms created a distinct notion of the majority versus the “other” minority which
sanctioned potential discrimination towards Chinese in the Philippines. Incorporating the
various influences in effect when defining the fluid relationship that arises when
identifying as Chinese in the Philippines, this section unpacks the complex relationships
between Chinese merchants and their families in both China and the Philippines. Through
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use of primary sources among interviews with family members in the Philippines who
identify as Chinese-Filipino, as well as dissection of texts this section aims to begin to
clarify the ambiguity that accompanies the complex nature of being Chinese-Filipino
today.

Among the growing Chinese population in the Philippines, the three major
influences on the Fujianese diaspora involve history of colonization, merging of customs
and practices, and Western hegemony. Specifically, the longstanding history of Fujianese
merchants in the Spanish Philippines during the 16th century led to the intermingling of
customs and practices that resulted in the unique identity of Chinese-Filipino individuals.
During the early 20th century specifically, aspects of colonization and Western
hegemony have always played an essential role in the background formation of identity
in the Philippines, whether under Spanish colonial rule or under the influence of the
United States of America after World War II. These influences on the Fujianese diaspora
in the Philippines had a significant effect on the Chinese-Filipino individuals’
experiences, forming clashing nationalistic identities and a sense of pride in the
“otherness.” This chapter accounts for the narrative of Chinese history throughout the
Philippines through the events of Spanish colonization, Chinese nationalism, Filipino
nationalism, and finally Western colonization.

Parián Paradise: Chinese Identity in Spanish Philippines
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The physical segregatory sentiments originated from Chinatowns across the globe
that represent the cultural persistence and versatility that Overseas Chinese foster. Like
the rising presence of the Fujianese merchants in the Spanish colonial Philippines, these
culturally specific districts represent the long standing history of Chinese migration to an
area with very little Chinese population. These developments allow for a mutually
beneficial relationship between the migrant communities and the host country,
specifically the Fujianese merchant migrants in the early 16th and 17th century Spanish
Philippines. Although most major cities in the developed countries around the world have
a Chinatown, Binondo in Manila holds the title of the oldest and first Chinatown in the
66

world. As early as the 1570s, merchants from Fujian Province claimed to have struck
67

gold by discovering the New World in the island of Luzon. As a location, Binondo was
ideal for “wholesale and retail trading for commodities” because of its proximity to major
ports and harbors, fostering maritime trade and growing population of Fujianese
68

immigrants. Though these merchants did not quite literally find gold in the Philippines,
they were able to find a steady supply of silver. These Fujianese traders were present in
the Philippines long before the establishment of an official Chinatown, “it was after the
founding of Manila by the Spaniards in 1571 that the city became the single largest
foreign port for Chinese goods for the next two centuries and the place from which New
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World silver flowed into China via the galleon trade.” Not only did the emergence of
silver attract these Fujianese travelers, but the potential for social mobility and a better
life further enhanced the growth of trade relations between China and the Philippines.

Incentivized by the economic profit and trade opportunity, these Fujianese
70

merchants seized the sudden uprise of potential that presented itself in Manila. Due to
the timing of economic events in China, these Fujianese migrants were no strangers to the
Philippines even before the documentation of their migration in the 16th century. Trade
routes had been established “either directly across the Pacific in the Manila galleons or
71

indirectly via Europe and its trading links with Asia.” Though the initial population of
Fujianese migrants in the Philippines tended to be low income individuals in search for
better opportunities, the “Spanish conquest of Manila occurred at an opportune time in
China. The changing economic conditions in China began to sway imperial policy back
in Fujian’s favor. A monetary crisis due to overprinting paper money led to the
government to require that all tax payments be made in silver, which was scarce and
72

highly valued.” This increasing demand for silver caused the Fujianese population in
the Philippines to skyrocket due to the large outflow of merchants that were highly active
in the silver trade. “In the Philippines, the Chinese population grew from about 40 in
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1570 to more than 15,000 by 1600 and each year large numbers of merchants sailed from
73

the ports of Fujian and Guangdong to trade in Manila.” The Fujianese merchants and
businessmen were an essential spark plug to the Spanish Philippines’ economy. As a
vehicle for linking together both the Chinese and Philippine economy, these Chinese
migrants contributed to the joint dependence and collaboration between the two countries
by occupying this unique “third space.” Especially “after the Spanish colonial
government established the Manila-Acapulco galleon trade system in 1571, the Chinese
74

found a ‘niche’ in the Spanish colonial economy.” This Chinese niche that heavily
sought after silver supply, further enhanced the economic activity of the Spanish
Philippines. Although the Fujianese presence was not uncommon in Manila, “the Spanish
conquest and the silver-laden galleons that followed, opened up a transpacific economy
75

with unprecedented opportunities.” Particularly during a period of time where silver
was extremely valuable to these Chinese migrants, the Fujianese merchants would
purchase silks, cottons and ceramics, had the intention of exporting these goods in
76

exchange for foreign silver. Not only did this alteration incentivized Fujianese
merchants to participate in the silver galleon trade affect the Spanish Philippines, but it
also had an effect on trade around the world. During the 16th century, “the Chinese
demand for silver is what elevated the value of the commodity and provided the impetus
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for trade around the globe." The foundation for this important Pacific trade relationship
between Spain’s American colonies and China through the Philippines was implemented
as early as in “1564 when a Spanish fleet under the command of Miguel Lopez de
Legaspi sailed across the central Pacific from New Spain,” giving life to the transpacific
trade between the Spanish and the Philippines, also providing a source of silver for the
78

Chinese. Shifting the global economy, Fujianese migrants sparkplugged the budding
seeds of globalization in the Philippines. Although the Chinese were a seemingly
beneficial economic asset to the Philippines, lingering sentiments of otherness and
separateness were still apparent in the Philippines. The additional factor of religion
among these Chinese merchants further enhanced the mixed treatment among Filipinos
and Chinese-Filipinos.

There was not only an exchange of goods like silver between the Chinese-Filipino
individuals and Dominican missionaries in the Spanish Philippines, but also a priority
towards the exchange of new religious beliefs. Like that of the profit-bearing travelers
and traders, Dominican friars aimed to spread and expand Christianity to Asia and China
79

by passing through the Philippines. Specifically “in Manila, the Dominicans hoped to
unlock that door by engaging and growing an economically vital community of Chinese
merchants and migrants from the nearby Fujian Province. The Spaniards called them
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Sangleys, after the Hokkien sing-li, meaning ‘trade’ or ‘doing business.’” This newly
formed labeling of these Chinese-Filipino individuals was a common theme of Chinese
relations in the Philippines, forming a sense of “otherness” and awareness of the Chinese
“differentness” from the ideal Filipino locals. Because of the Spaniards in Manila
fostered sentiments of “fear and distrust of the Chinese as a result of their historical
experiences with non-Spanish and non-Christian peoples in the Iberian peninsula…
Non-Christian Chinese were either deported or restricted in their movements and
81

interaction with the locals.” In 1594, the Spanish government took action to the rise in
population of non-Christian Sangleys, creating a segregated community specifically for
the Chinese immigrant population to trade. Between the walls of the Manila Cathedral
and the doors of Santo Domingo Church, the market space and Chinese living quarters
82

were referred to as the Parián.  These Sangley quarters in the Chinese Parián of Manila
for non-Christian Chinese in compliance to the Dominican mission, fostered the growing
transpacific trade and relationship between the Spanish and Sangleys in the Philippines.

83

The physical barrier formation segregating these non-Christian Chinese from “other”
conforming figures. This allowed negative sentiments to resonate among the Spanish
Christian authorities in power with any sort of intermingling between these rebellious
non-Christian Chinese individuals. In this way, the Parián was a district that fostered the
mutually beneficial relationship between the Sangleys and the Dominican missionaries
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providing the Chinese with a government recognized commonplace while providing the
potential to achieve the Dominicans’ “ultimate goal… to ‘seek martyrdom among the
84

Chinese’ in China.” Although those Christian Chinese in Binondo were treated with
more respect than the non-Christians who resided in the Parián, these Chinese individuals
were still essential to the Spaniards in bridging the gap between the Philippines and Asia.
According to ethnographer and intercultural author, Juliet Uytanlet, “the Chinese success
and constant increase in population caused alarm among the Spaniards that led to a
85

number of massacres and the destruction of the Chinese settlements.” The missionaries
aimed to utilize the Parián district as a method to trace the Chinese networks back to
mainland China in order to achieve their goal of spreading Christianity to broader Asia.
In response, the non-Christian Chinese members in the Parián tended to convert to
Christianity out of convenience, “choos[ing] to be baptized only because the State and the
Catholic Church granted more rights and benefits to converts. After having been
86

converted, however, they returned to their ‘pagan’ ways.” This unique relationship that
the non-Christian Chinese individuals had with the Spaniards and local Filipinos formed
a sense of “otherness” among the Chinese in the Parián.
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Contributing to the complex relationship formation among the Spanish authorities
and the Sangleys, the Parián was an essential location “full of blurred visions, awkward
87

translations, and tricksters.” Essential because of its capacity to host an amalgamation
of multiple cultures, among Dominican Spaniards, local Tagalog-speaking Filipinos, and
Fujianese merchants from China. This symbiotic relationship formed as “the Spanish
began very quickly to rely on the Sangleyes, not only for goods from China, but for all
kinds of services in their colony. All the craftsmen, storekeepers, unskilled laborers, and
88

most farmers, fisherman, and domestic servants were Chinese. The keystone district of
the Parián was crucial in forming the transpacific relations between Asia and America,
straddling the line “between missions and commerce, the story of the Sangley-Spanish
encounter in the Parián reveals global and transoceanic forces that were contingent on
89

local interactions.” The combination of these Spanish missionaries as well as the rise in
demand for silver, silks, sugar, and other luxury goods hand in hand with a monetary
perspective, created an opportune time for Fujianese populations to rise in the Spanish
Philippines. The rise in population of the Chinese posed a potential threat to the masses in
the Philippines which led to the inherent societal segregation. This rise in population
implied a rise in power which cultivated “resentment and restrictions towards the Chinese
[which] resulted in their segregation and concentration in Binondo, population control for
centuries, and inevitably, the development and encouragement of the vocation of trade
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that reinforced the stereotypes.” These sentiments of segregation, isolation, and
discrimination carried on further during the gradual formation of Filipino identity
throughout the 20th century.

Opportunities Sprouting from Prejudice and “Otherness”
The complex relationship formed by the creation of a physically segregated
community for non-Christian Chinese Sangleys in the Spanish Philippines was not
always symbiotic and civil. This distinct sense of “otherness” admitted to the Sangleys by
the formation of the Parián from the culturally normative attitudes adopted by the
Spanish, fostered attitudes of discrimination by nature. By the early nineteenth century,
the Hokkien term, Sangley, slowly transitioned into the term “Chino” or “Tsinoy” which
was derived by the Chinese population becoming more diverse and “identified more as
91

nationals of China than Chinese merchants.” Throughout the nineteenth century, the
social structure in the Philippines had altered dramatically. With the transition from the
barangay or barrio framework where groupings or municipalities were separated by
regions that allowed for easier ruling of small communities, to classes segregated by
racial background. Of these social classes, the Chinese were placed at the lowest tier in
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society. The Spaniards successfully segregated and isolated the pure Chinese from the
pure Filipinos, but failed at spreading Christianity and assimilating them into the Spanish
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community. This fostered a sense of “Chineseness of the Chinese people, uniting them
as one in times of crisis and trouble” which further raised a sense of nationalism among
Chinese-Filipinos in the Philippines.

On the topic of embracing “Chineseness” and the Chinese-Filipino identity, I
asked my aunt, Tita Mely, if she had experienced attitudes of prejudice or discrimination
regarding her identity as Chinese-Filipino. Straddling the line between being “seen as too
Filipino in school, but also 'intsik beho' on the streets,” as she mentioned the derogatory
94

connotations behind the names uttered towards her during her childhood. The term
“intsik beho” was coined during a time when the Chinese Filipinos were discriminated by
both the Filipinos and the Spanish communities in the Philippines, whereas “intsik” was a
negative term used to describe the Chinese associated with eating congee, while “beho”
was an alteration of the term “viejo” meaning “old” in Spanish. Although these pejorative
connotations associated with the term “intsik beho” and being called “Intsik” are used to
denote and categorize Chinese in the Philippines, the term is a form of the hybridized
cultural formation emerging from the aspects of globalization and transcultural
integration.

The close association with their homeland ties and family values distinguished the
Chinese-Filipino individuals from those of pure Filipino background. My aunt spoke
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about her childhood weeknights that were spent at her host family’s home, where her and
my uncle’s busy schedules only allowed them to return home to Marikina, a city East of
Manila, on Sundays for a couple of hours. My uncle, Papa Johnny or Juanito, mentioned
95

the term “tsekwa” or “chekwa” which is also a derogatory term that was used to tease
and make fun of the Chinese, while the Chinese would call the Filipinos, hoan-á, which
96

means foreigner or barbarian in Hokkien. Similarly, my dad and his younger brother
who attended Grace Christian, a Chinese Christian School in Quezon City, spoke of his
experience riding the bus to and from school. He vividly remembered having to roll up
the windows when passing by the low-life cigarette vendors who gathered at the street
corners, swarming the bus to tease and batok ( the Tagalog word for smack) him and the
other children on the back of their heads. On the bus, they would generally be called
“chinks” and hear “intsik beho kain lugaw” (congee eaters who were weak in the knees)
which were intended to insult him and the other children for their Chinese background.
These low-income individuals on the streets were typically uneducated and ignorant,
97

“they teased us because we were different.” Although there were different motivations
and incentives behind the emotions towards Chinese-Filipino relations, attitudes of
national pride and heritage became the norm.

This term originated from a combination of the Philippine Hokkien saying “Intsik gwakang” or
in chek/chiak, góa kang [ 叔,我工] meaning his or her uncle that was later morphed and
shortened to tsekwa or chekwa.
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Individuals interviewed in Juliet Uytanlet’s book, The Hybrid Tsinoys, shared
related experiences when asked questions regarding their identification as Chinese in the
Philippines. Chris, a first generation Chinese mestizo who also attended Chinese school,
mentioned that “what [he] liked about Chinese is that if they know you are Chinese, they
will accept you. Similarly, what [he] does not like is that if they learn you are hoan-á, yun
98

na negative na (they already have negative responses).” Depending on who asks, the
levels of prejudice will be judged accordingly and affects the illicit response. Alternately,
my cousin Wilson, mentioned that he did not experience harsh mistreatment, because
“most of the Chinese were financially capable in comparison to the common Filipinos.”

99

He went on to point out that as long as you were civil, minded one's own business, and
did your job, not showing off too much to inhibit sentiments of jealousy or bad attitudes,
no harsh attitudes from the local Filipinos. These varying perspectives regarding identity
as mixed-race Chinese-Filipino in the Philippines show the generations of progress and
adaptations that have transformed since the 16th century.

These “cultural notions of nation-based identities” accompanied by the rise of
Chinese nationalism and Filipino nationalism accompanied the trends in familial
practices of Chinese merchant families during the early twentieth century. Corresponding
with the historic rise in nationalism in China, the older generations of Chinese (those
born in the 1920’s and 1930’s) in the Philippines “still [felt] strongly attached to China
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are products of the rise of nationalism in China and the Philippines.”

100

This sense of

pride in “Chineseness” can be traced throughout my grandfather’s experience, who was
born in Fujian in 1913 and migrated to the Philippines in 1939. After getting married into
a poor and hard situation in Fujian at the age of 18, my grandfather sought a method of
migration to the Philippines. His brother-in-law was a General in the Chinese army, but
was based in the Philippines during the Japanese occupation in the 50s, and assisted in
foraging a fake birth certificate and accompanying documents to stay in the Philippines.
This was the birth of the local name “Amando Cotangco” which he later used to start his
family in the Philippines, after marrying my grandmother, Angelina Reyes, a
Filipino-born with distant Spanish heritage. My grandfather first worked in a restaurant in
Pasig, then moved on to open up a grocery store which later closed down. Eventually, he
had formed enough connections and earned enough money to open up a “bigasan” or rice
retailing business, which was a popular business in Marikina,that he settled in. Together
with his brother, Eng, my grandfather opened a shoe last factory called “Modern Heel”
which later sprouted into a leather shoe factory. Along with some of the unique themes
and traditions adopted by Chinese merchants living in the Philippines, came the practice
of having multiple wives, one in mainland China and one in the Philippines. The Chinese
practice of having “concubines” became culturally specific when these individuals
resided in the Philippines. In practice, the Chinese merchants in the Philippines “who
took in Filipino ‘concubines,’ or ‘secondary wives,’ their Chinese wives and families
condoned this practice as long as ‘proper priority’ was given them, in that the union with
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101

the Filipino ‘wives’ occured after the marriage in China.”

In a similar vein, my

grandfather had a wife and two children in Fujian, prior to migrating to the Philippines in
search of better opportunities.

102

The dual marriage practices were common among many
103

of the rich Chinese merchants who spent their time in both China and the Philippines.

Asking around among my cousins and uncles, there was little questions asked towards
my grandfather’s decision to live a dual life, fostering two families and maintaining
relationships with all of his sons and daughters. When directly addressing this concept of
dual family practice with family members, they casually overlooked it, taking a positive
outlook regarding the beneficial result of having a larger family. These sentiments geared
towards appreciating familial values are deeply ingrained in both Chinese and Filipino
culture. Although after “the height of Chinese nationalism in the Philippines in the 1930s,
unions with Filipinas, whether legal or otherwise, began to be perceived ‘as a threat to the
104

existence of the Chinese community by racial dilution and acculturation.’”

This

reiterates the notion of “otherness” and emerges from the transcultural hybridity and the
“third space” that straddles the line between acknowledging tradition and maneuvering a
new sphere.
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The unique cultural characteristics that the Chinese mestizos harbored have been
driven by discrimination, segregation, and colonization. Although the derogatory terms
and ambivalence towards identifying as “Chinese” dependent upon who inquires, this
dual identity shines through as beneficial. The sentiments of “nationalism swept the
country, the Chinese acknowledged their gratitude to the Philippines for giving them a
105

place for refuge by calling themselves Filipino-Chinese.”

Through compiling

information from family members as well as secondary sources, I have been able to
dissect the progressive but hybrid nature that comes along with approaching what it
means to identify as Chinese-Filipino. In this way, globalization contrasts tradition in the
expansive and inclusive nature that encompasses the dichotomy and duality of the birth
of a hybrid “third culture.”
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Chapter 3: Big Mac in a Small World
“About four-fifths of the world's population, most of whom live in what is
commonly called the Third World, have had their lives shaped by the experience of
colonialism. However, global-impacting developments beginning with the end of the
1980s, and the whole phenomenon of globalization have contributed to a more dynamic
106

foregrounding of postcolonialism. ”

Directly correlating to the Spanish colonial era in

the Philippines and how Fujianese individuals belong, Michaela Wolf’s perspective on
globalization as a “dynamic foreground” ties together the universal effect that comes
hand in hand with cultural formation in the “third space.” The progression of the cultural
formation that links the Fujianese migratory patterns with the hybridized cultural nuances
of Filipino-Chinese identity in a globalized postcolonial context. Through a brief
introduction of George Ritzer’s term, McDonaldization, I will provide a foundational
background on the progress of globalization and the effect on hybridity among cultures.
The negotiation of national identity as well as unification under a common theme results
in the formation of a “third space” and the acknowledgment of multiple cultures. Through
the constantly progressing lens of cultural globalization, hybridization allows for the
107

formation of a new type of culture, individually driven by local and foreign forces.

As

a result of both colonization and the rise in capitalism throughout the global economy,
hybridity among cultures and the formation of this “third space” has become an
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increasingly common phenomenon around the world. Especially during the Internet era
of the twenty-first century, information and communication is easily and readily available
and intercultural exchange is not an uncommon phenomenon.

Through the lens of cultural globalization, hybridization creates a new type of
culture driven by local and foreign forces. Particularly after a transitional era in China,
from a socialist to market-based economy, it is important to evaluate the prevalence of
outside forces on the progress of the formation of a new identity among the Fujianese
diaspora. With regards to Fujianese merchant out-migration and the unique ambiguity of
the Filipino-Chinese identity, a proper understanding of hybridity in a global sense serves
as a tool to understand the fluid and continuous definition of the third space in cultural
formation. Is there something lost from a culture’s authenticity when foreign elements are
introduced? At what point does a cultural hybrid become identified as a core culture
rather than a cultural mixture?

The rise in phenomenon of McDonaldization, introduced by George Ritzer, an
American sociologist, professor, and author who studies globalization and social theory,
allows for further analysis of the larger implications of globalization. In the framework of
my argument, McDonaldization is an example of the progressing nature of globalization
under the broader significance of capitalism. Commonly known as: Mickey D’s, Golden
Arches, Mak Kee, Makku, or McDick’s, these are all shorthand variations and/or slang
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for McDonald’s, one of the most recognizable fast-food chains across the globe.

108

However, this chapter is not about the fast-food industry or the commercialization of the
famous clown, Ronald McDonald, alternatively I will be assessing how McDonald’s food
chain acts as a global phenomenon and how it serves as the quintessential example of
globalization’s range, particularly in the postcolonial era of social media. In this sense,
this route of globalization can be seen through the capitalistic contemporary lens with the
presence of McDonald’s as a large chain existing in multiple spheres throughout the
world. In tangent with a rapidly modernizing world, McDonald’s has been able to expand
their brand on a global sphere, asserting its dominance in the fast food industry. An
example of the influential effect that McDonald’s has on a global sphere is presented in
the September 1986 edition of The Economist, a prestigious magazine publication, which
released the first annual “Big Mac Index” as a part of “burgernomics” indicating the
purchasing power of currencies around the world in relation to the local price of the Big
109

Mac.

This index represents the importance of McDonald’s global presence, particularly

during a time of rising commercialization and an increasing rise in consumption,
specifically, the fast food industry. The “trend of growing worldwide interconnectedness
has been accompanied by several clashing notions of cultural difference” that makeup
110

globalization.

Especially during a time when social media allows for easily accessible

Alex Frank, “What McDonald’s Is Nicknamed Around the World,” spoonuniversity.com,
https://spoonuniversity.com/lifestyle/mcdonalds-nicknames-around-the-world
109
George Ritzer, “An Introduction to McDonaldization,” The McDonaldization of Society, Pine
Forge Press 1993, 11.
110
Jan Nederveen Pieterse, “Globalization as Hybridization,” International Sociology, Vol. 9, No.
2, (Rowman & Littlefield, June 1994): p. 41.
108

Cotangco
51

interconnectedness and collaboration among cultures, acknowledgement of cultural and
national differences is extremely essential. For example, although the “Big Mac Index”
implies that there is consistency throughout all McDonald’s branches throughout the
world, McDonald’s in China has experienced an extremely rapid approach to expansion
than that of McDonald’s in America.

McDonaldization theory acknowledges the homogenization of societies during an
era of rising capitalism and rapid modernization. This example demonstrates the varying
positionality of globalization as “a form of intercultural hybridization, partly in its origins
111

and certainly in its present globally localizing variety of forms.”

McDonaldization

alludes to some aspects of global implications that arise in tangent to the United States
and the rise of consumption. Globalization is commonly interpreted as a standardization
112

or “cultural synchronization” that is further tied with modernity.

Alternately,

globalization theories can be classified to varying degrees depending on the basis of their
emphasis on the duality that the globalization of culture provides. These differing
viewpoints expose two clashing extremes that pose both an optimistic view adhering
towards hybridity and the creation of a new “third space” as well as a realistic perspective
underscoring the blatant deletion of original cultures. According to Homi Bhabha, “the
113

Third Space ‘carries the burden of the meaning of culture.’”

He defines this space as

existing in between “former fixed territories that the whole body of resistant
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hybridization comes into being in the form of fragile syncretisms, contrapuntal
recombinations and acculturation.”

114

The Chinese-Filipino identity as hybrid, rather

than a deletion of one culture in priority over another, is an example of the collaboration
involved in the formation of Bhabha’s “third space.” Ranging from the understanding
that the world is becoming a more uniform and standardized to recognizing the
contextualization of cultural background and history, “globalization of culture can lead
either to a trend toward common codes and practices (homogeneity) or to a situation in
which many cultures interact to create a kind of pastiche or a blend leading to a variety of
hybrids (heterogeneity).”

115

The understanding that the world is becoming increasingly

more uniform and standardized through means of modernization extends an optimistic
perspective towards hybridization of cultures in a global context. Michaela Wolf
interprets Homi Bhabha’s analysis of hybridity as “not simply a third term that resolves
the tension between two cultures in a dialectal play of ‘recognition,’ and cannot be
116

discussed as an issue of cultural relativism.”

The collaboration between two cultures, in

this case, the Spanish colonial Philippines and Chinese migrants from Fujian, cooperate
to form the unique and “culturally relative” identity of Chinese-Filipino.

On the other hand, modernization also imposes the potential “erasing cultural and
biological diversity in its way, and now not only the gains (rationalization,
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standardization, control) but also the losses (alienation, disenchantment, displacement)
117

are becoming apparent.”

Albeit, “with respect to cultural forms, hybridization is [also]

defined as ‘the ways in which forms become separated from existing practices and
118

recombine with new forms in new practices.’”

The notion of separating in order to

successfully recombine and form anew is an fundamental aspect that comes along with
hybrid cultural formation. The dichotomy between homogeneity and heterogeneity
recognizes the clashing notions of cultural difference that comes hand in hand with the
rapid process of modernization. For example, in Homi Bhabha’s work, he frames this
process to be “imitating an original in such a way that the priority of the original is not
reinforced but by the very fact that it can be simulated, copied, transferred, transformed,
made into a simulacrum and so on: the ‘original’ is never finished or complete in itself.

119

Through proper understanding of modernization, distinct from Western hegemonic and
Eurocentric approaches, rather in a global capitalistic sense, topics of hybridity through
the progressive lens of globalization allows for the creation of the “third space.” This
framework allows for advances in the development of modernization, providing an
outlook for cultures like that of Chinese individuals in the Philippines, to acknowledge
their original heritage while combating obstacles of new cultural formation in a foreign
sphere.
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Uniformity at the Cost of Resistance and Depletion
Although global homogenization adheres to recognizing cultural differences and
aiming towards a more uniform social relations, “globalization is not an all-encompassing
process of homogenization but a complex mixture of homogenization and
120

heterogenization.”

It can be broken down to associate homogeneity to be categorized

under cultural imperialism and heterogeneity with localism. Often times, this conflict
highlights implications of “otherness” that comes when cultures clash and combine.
Similar to the Chinese mestizo experience negotiating the Philippines under Spanish
colonialism, this formation of hybrid identity was composed through distinctive
formation of the majority in power versus the minority other group. In this sense,
“hybridity therefore describes a process in which the single voice of colonial authority
undermines the operation of colonial power by inscribing and disclosing the trace of the
other so that it reveals itself as double-voiced.”
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This homogenizing form of

standardization or unification often disregards the localities and the indigenous cultural
differences, often associated with cultural imperialism and the rise in the spread of
122

market economy.

Separation and notions of “otherness” often lead to discrimination

and competition, resulting in loss of authenticity.

Interestingly enough, conflict that tends to divide humanity, like conquest and
opposition, also tend to unite humankind through antagonism and formation of a “global
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melenge” of cultural experiences, slowly coming to formation through adaptation to other
123

cultures.

The negotiation between the deletion of cultures, but also the formation and

evolution of a new third dimension that arises from the “divergent cultural patterns”
124

allude to a “transcultural space. ”

Although this can often lead to misinterpretations and

cultural divergence, this unique interpretation has come into fruition after taking into
account histories of colonization and Western imperialism. In this sense, hybridization or
hybridity refers to the construction of new culture that emerges from the interweaving of
elements between the colonizers and colonized, challenging the validity of any fixed
125

indigenous cultural identity.

A specific example of this combination and intercultural

communication is the Spanish Philippines and the formation of a mestizo i dentity. This
reiterates Pieterse’s definition that “globalization taken widely, however, refers to the
formation of a worldwide historical field and involves the development of global
memory, arising from shared global experiences. Such shared global experiences range
from intercivilizational encounters such as long-distance trade and migration to slavery,
conquest, war, imperialism, colonialism.”
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The Spanish Christian conquests in the Philippines and intermingling between
Dominican friars and local indigenous Filipinos are a culmination of years of
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homogenization that creates an identity of subculture. Furthermore, Dick Hebdige’s
conceptualization of subculture as “a form of resistance in which experienced
contradictions and objections to this ruling ideology are obliquely represented in style” is
127

useful in that it prioritizes the form of resistance to the dominant social norm.

This

raises the potential question of who has the authority to dictate what becomes
standardized to be socially accepted as the “norm” when referring to the common
practices and traditions of a culture? Authenticity is lost in the homogenization process,
as commonly seen in Western imperialism. This theme is often translated in the
American context where the consolidation of cultures into a melting pot of uniformity is
normalized through pursuit of the American Dream.

Salad Bowl > Melting Pot
An important distinction must be made in clarifying the difference between
modernity and globalization, as a result of Westernization. Although this process of
modernity originated from Western imperialism, creating a new space while
acknowledging “worldwide social relations,” it must be interpreted loosely as a salad
128

bowl rather than a melting pot.

Avoiding the Eurocentric angle that problematizes the

global perspective of the formation of new cultures, the theory of a salad bowl
emphasizes the importance of not diluting indigenous cultures, but rather highlighting
and acknowledging authentic themes. In contrast with the more conventional “melting
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pot,” that merges and dilutes cultures, imposes marginalization and assimilation rather
than a multicultural salad bowl that calls for integration and recognition of diverse ethnic
129

backgrounds.

Particularly looking back at United States history, the idea of achieving

the “American Dream” favors the Western perspective of multiple cultures merging
together to form a nationalistic melting pot of cultures that encapsulate what it means to
be American. In contrast, Homi Bhabha’s “concept of hybridity is radically
heterogeneous and discontinuous, a dialectical articulation that involves a new
130

perspective of cultural representation.”

This approach to a hybridized society allows for

acceptance rather than deletion of new perspectives, highlighting the heterogeneous
manner that Bhabha implies. With this sentiment in mind, immigrants, like Fujianese
immigrants and merchants, assimilate into their host country’s new world culture and
encounter obstacles to maintain their traditional cultural practices of what it means to be
authentically Chinese. I was able to witness a result of this hybridization first-hand during
my time in the Philippines where I attended my cousin Sherrielyn’s wedding where
Hokkien, Tagalog, and English were all spoken.

Critical theorist and scholar of hybridity and the Third Space in a postcolonial
context, Homi Bhabha introduces the “third dimension,” negotiating the intersubjective
131

realm that blurs the boundaries between intervention and insertion.

These blurred
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boundaries, arise hand in hand with the observations of intercultural discourse between
distribution of power among Western and non-Western cultures that aline with
132

sentiments of Western imperialism.

In the process of new cultural formation, it is

important to distinguish between deletion of culture and appreciation. The progressive
formation of Chinese-Filipino identity in a postcolonial context encompasses this notion
of creating a “third space” identity. Jin Dal Yong (2016) mentions in his analysis of
hybridity, “conflict, conquest, and oppression only divide people, then nations themselves
would merely be artifacts of division for they too were mostly born out of conflict.”
Acknowledging the theories of globalization and hybridity in a Western dominated
sphere, this progression is “far from giving us a universally homogenous culture,
globalization defines a space in which the world’s cultures rub elbows and generate new,
133

heterogeneous meanings and understandings.”

This comparison and development of a

new “third space” as a result of crossover cultures and intercultural collaboration, directly
corresponds with the unique Chinese-Filipino identity comes into fruition, allowing for
acknowledgement of the traditional past and a more progressive future.

This negotiation of intersections between global and local forces encompass a rich
history of colonization while acknowledging the new spaces that come into fruition to
form the unique identity of what it means to be Filipino. These “multiple identities and
the decentering of the social subject are grounded in the ability of individuals to avail
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themselves of several organizational options at the same time. Thus globalization is the
134

framework for the diversification and amplification of ‘sources of the self.’”

In

reconsidering who necessarily dictates the cultural normativity that deems itself as the
“standard,” the true definition arises intrinsically. In this way, experiences of conflict also
unite humankind, producing an ambivalent unity that emerges out of the ashes of
135

antagonism, conflict, and oppression.

This hybrid identity has laid the foundation for

Filipinos around the diaspora to embrace this “third space” identity of assimilation,
whether that be as a Fujianese merchant in the Spanish Philippines or a Chinese mestizo
navigating the streets of postcolonial Manila. The blurred boundaries mentioned in
Bhabha’s third space involves new forms and cultural meaning and production to occur,
blurring the limitations of existing boundaries and calling into question the established
136

classifications of culture and identity.

Although hybridization often leads to ambiguity

and the “in-between” identity, Bhabha points out that “hybridity needs to open up a ‘third
space’ within which diverse elements encounter and transform… where minority
discourses intervene to preserve their strengths and particularity.”

137

This complex and

overlapping identity is a result of the new hybridized global order. Identity formation is a
continuous cycle and is constantly progressing as a reemerging transnational relationships
form.
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Conclusion:
Fujianese migration has been a widely discussed, largely due to the legal and
illegal implications associated with the migration of its people. Specifically among
Fujianese migrants in the Philippines, there are those who embody the indigenous
Filipino culture and those who have brought a migrant culture from Fujian Province.
With this transcultural mixing, we now have a creation of a “third space” that centers on
both the formation of a new cultural identity while acknowledging and maintaining the
authentic culture of their homeland. In beginning to unpack this unique circumstance, I
interviewed family members who have directly experienced, and been affected by, this
phenomenon of “illegal” migration from Fujian. In interviewing my family members, I
found that they had to selectively choose when and where to appropriate the cultural
identity they associated themselves with. Thinking about those who had migrated from
Fujian in order to establish a new life and create new waves of cultural identity, I’m
reminded of my time in China.

During my summer abroad, studying and interning in Shanghai, I was constantly
approached with the question: Nǐ shì hàn guórén ma? [你是汉国人吗？] which in
translation means “Are you ethnically Han Chinese?” There was constant inquiry
regarding my ethnicity and cultural background, whether it be by a range of random
strangers on the street or by my peers. Unsure of how to respond, I answered that I was
American, but that my parents were born and raised in the Philippines. I vividly recall the
man who approached me on the street who was unsatisfied with my response, further
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questioning where my father’s father originated from. When I had finally told him that
my grandfather migrated from Fujian, he sighed with relief and suggested that I respond
accordingly next time, with the claim that I was indeed Han Chinese. This interaction left
me puzzled as to why he had felt so strongly about my identity and what it meant to
identify as ethnically Han, the largest ethnic group in China.

During the years going into college, I traced my racial breakdown through my
family tree and came to the conclusion that, yes, I am technically 33% ethnically Han
Chinese because of my grandfather’s Fujianese roots, but I am also 33% Spanish and
33% Filipino. Though in America, I am simply categorized under the broader term
“Asian,” under the assumption that there are only five or six racial categories available in
the multiple choice bubble section above “Other.” In navigating this sphere of cultural
ambiguity that characterizes the Filipino-American identity, I was able to deeply
self-reflect on my own personal experience, as well as mirrored experiences of
Chinese-Filipinos throughout the diaspora. These joint experiences inspired this topic of
research regarding cultural hybridity during a century of rapid globalization.

What I took from my experience is that individuals around the world are
predominantly a mixture of hybrid cultures constantly migrating and forming new spaces.
In the creation of a “third space” it is important to acknowledge the role that snakeheads
provided in facilitating the successful migration of culture. Snakeheads directly influence
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cultural preservation through utilizing their intricate guanxi network of Chinese
individuals both in Fujian and throughout the diaspora. The fundamental role of the
snakehead, also considered a middle-man in the human smuggling process, is a keystone
element in routes of migration and cultural formation in new spaces. In the creation of a
new migrant identity and culture, we can’t overlook the role that the snakeheads held in
facilitating cultural migration and the new identities that followed. From my research it’s
clear that these well-connected individuals play an essential role in the formation of
Chinese identities throughout the diaspora. Imperative to facilitating relationships
between migrants and their host countries, snakeheads maintain a unique position of
crossing the boundaries between cultures and creating a new “third space.” My
experience in China as an individual who fits into the ambiguous “third space” of not
directly belonging to the broader majority while adhering to a specific perceived identity
has allowed me to negotiate this distinctive “otherness.”

Addressing my identity as a Filipino-Chinese American citizen while navigating
the new spheres provided in a culturally diverse country, I have come to acknowledge the
nuances that come hand in hand with hybridity. Rapid globalization has formed links
between and among cultures that further contribute to the construction of hybrid
identities. Taking into consideration the various spheres of influence involved in this
process, like government corruption, this proposed issue of human smuggling associated
with the snakehead business has a global effect. In this way, Fujianese migration
becomes a microcosm for a larger, global phenomenon. When we consider the
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implications of “illegal” migration and the creation of a new “third space,” we
acknowledge the past experiences that contribute to the progressive collection of fluid
hybrid identities. The concept of hybridity and understanding cultural differences is
essential and transcultural links continue to grow and progress. This pressing and relevant
topic regarding the various routes hybridity takes is apparent, particularly in
Filipino-Chinese identities like my own.

In speaking with locals in Shanghai, particularly the man who assigned me the
identity that I should claim while in China, I learned the importance in focusing on
oneness rather than distinctions of “otherness.” I became privy to the intricacies involved
in recognizing the fluid and ambiguous nature that comes with identity. Although there
are various factors that come into play when combating identity, the multiplicity of
cultural borders are a permanent feature of contemporary societies. Transcultural links
have played an integral role in the postcolonial twenty first century and continue to
establish the narratives of hybrid individuals. In my final interviews with my family
members, the development was made that “Filipinos are survivors. We are able to adapt
and thrive [to the environment] wherever we end up at. Filipinos are more focused on
being able to do well and succeed rather than be restricted to identifying with ethnicity.”
138
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After speaking with my father and reflecting on his words, it reminded me of my
transition into college. When I first came to Claremont McKenna College, I had to
grapple with who I knew myself to be and who CMC thought I was. In recognizing this
moment of uncertain identity, I found myself conforming to the preconceived notions of
the CMC identity, whether that be in the classroom, on the basketball court, or in the
everyday social scene. In navigating this gray in-between “space” of identity formation, I
started to make decisions for myself in order to “do well” in my own areas of expertise
instead of adhering to a predescribed identity that was not necessarily me. In doing so, I
was able to examine and recognize the beauty in the growth. Looking progressively
towards the future, I was able to appreciate the identity assigned to me in this new space
while acknowledging the authenticities of my old perceived identity, in order to create an
identity of my own in this “third space.” I can see now how the formation of cultural
hybridity is not unique to my own experience, instead, it reveals an experience had by all,
and too, recognizes the permanence that cultural hybridity has on a global level.
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